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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), and by Rules 3, and 4, of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Petitioner and Appellee, Judith Wanda Lowry, and the 
Respondent and Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, were married in the City of 
Dalton within the State of Massachusetts, on August 20, 1960. The parties 
were married in the LDS Temple and remained married for over forty-three 
(43), years. (R. 1, 40, Tr. 3, 8/15/05 Tr. 4) 
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Four (4), children were born as issue of the Petitioner and the 
Respondent. All of the parties' children are adults and are fully emancipated 
and are not dependent upon the parties for their support. (R. 2). 
The Petitioner retired from the Shepard Montana School District in 
1994, and receives retirement therefrom in the sum of One Hundred Eighty 
Dollars Seventy-three Cents ($180.73), per month. She also receives Social 
Security income at the time of trial in the sum of Six Hundred Thirty-five 
Dollars ($635.00), per month, but this sum has been reduced by Seventy-
three Dollars ($73.00), per month since trial and she now receives Social 
Security income of Five Hundred Sixty-two Dollars ($562.00), per month. 
(Tr. 4, 8; 8/15/05 Tr. 5, Exhibits 2 & 4) 
The Petitioner is completely disabled. She has had six (6), foot 
surgeries resulting from peripheral neuropathy, is in need of further surgeries 
and suffers in continuous pain. The Petitioner has also had surgery fusing 
the vertebrae in her neck causing the Petitioner continuous pain. The 
Petitioner suffers from arthritis and is in present need of cataract surgery. 
(Tr. 18-22). 
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Petitioner suffers from arthritis and is in present need of cataract surgery. 
(Tr. 18-22). 
Becky Torgerson was subpoenaed by the Petitioner to testify as to the 
Petitioner's complete disability but was released from the subpoena at trial 
because the parties stipulated that the Petitioner was completely disabled 
(Tr. 43, Exhibit 6, R. 166). The Petitioner is receiving both physical therapy 
and other therapy, and the copay cost thereof is One Hundred Twenty 
Dollars ($120.00), per month. (Exhibit 6). 
The Respondent receives Social Security income in excess of One 
Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per month. (Tr. 4). The 
Respondent deposited into the parties' joint bank account funds from his 
retirement account and his social security from June, 2003, through April, 
2004, the eleven (11), months prior to the parties' separation, the sum of 
$42, 265.35, which averages $3,842.30, per month. These deposits did not 
include his income from his employment at Century 21 Real Estate nor the 
Petitioner's social security and retirement income. (Exhibit 8). 
The Respondent deposited income from Century 21, into the State 
Bank of Southern Utah and Zions Bank during the parties' marriage. On 
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July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a commission of 
$27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited into his personal 
account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and that all of the funds in this 
account were his. (Exhibit 18, R. 162-163). The Respondent had also 
deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at Zions Bank. 
(Exhibit 8). Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from Order to 
show Cause Hearing ordered the division of these accounts reserved for trial 
and any amounts withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount 
awarded at the time of trial. (R. 49, 171). The Petitioner was paid a lump 
sum payment of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), following the hearing 
upon her order to show cause. The monies in the accounts were marital 
property having been earned by the Respondent during the marriage from 
commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 21, where he had been 
employed since 2002. (Exhibits 10, 18, 31). 
The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had stints placed in his 
heart and has other medical problems. The Respondent is presently 
employed as a real estate agent at Century 21, in St. George, Utah. His 
adjusted gross income from his 1099, at Century 21 in the year 2004, was 
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Forty-seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-six Dollars Forty-three Cents 
($47, 276.43), although one of the commissions earned by the Respondent in 
the amount of Twenty-seven Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($27,600.00), 
was an unusual event. The Respondent's average monthly income from 
Century 21, alone for the year 2004, was Three Thousand Nine Hundred 
Thirty-nine Dollars Seventy Cents ($3,939.70). (Exhibits 10, 18, 31, Tr. 33, 
61,R. 166). 
The Respondent suffers from coronary and renal artery disease 
barring him from full time work. If the Respondent could work full time his 
income would be Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00), per 
month. The Respondent, on November 1, 2005, was only capable of part-
time work. The Respondent's health is in a changing status. The 
Respondent, on November 1, 2005, was capable of earning Two Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00), per month. (Tr. 22-26, R. 166). 
The Petitioner's monthly living expenses are Three Thousand Three 
Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine Cents ($3,304.89), per month. Her 
monthly need for financial or spousal support from the Respondent 
(following the deduction of her monthly social security and retirement 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
income in the sum of $742.73) is Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-nine 
Dollars Sixteen Cents ($2,489.16), per month. (Exhibit 27, R. 165-175). 
The Petitioner and the Respondent purchased a residence and real 
property in October, 2002, and during the marriage situate at 1020 East Fort 
Pierce Drive in the City of St. George in the County of Washington within 
the State of Utah. The purchase price of the parties' home and real property 
was One Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00). U.S. Bank is 
owed Eighty-two Thousand Forty-two Dollars Seventy-one Cents 
($82,042.71), as of the date of trial and the payment thereon is Six Hundred 
Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638.91), per month. (Exhibit 12). 
The Petitioner testified that the present fair market value of the marital 
residence and real property at the time of trial was One Hundred Seventy-
five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00). (Tr. 45). The Respondent, Kenneth 
Lowry, testified that the value of the marital residence was Two Hundred 
Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($215,000.0). (Tr. 44). 
On February 24, 2005, Craig Morley, a licensed, certified and 
accredited real estate appraiser of Morley & McConkie, L.C., performed an 
appraisal of the marital residence and real property. Mr. Morley was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
qualified as an expert witness as to the value of the parties' residence and 
real property. Mr. Morley determined and testified that the fair market value 
of the parties' residence and real property as of February 24, 2005, was One 
Hundred Eighty-five Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00). (Tr. 45-50). 
Accordingly, the parties have just less than One Hundred Three Thousand 
Dollars ($103,000.00), of equity in the marital residence and real property. 
The Petitioner paid Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00), from her separate 
inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and real 
property. (R. 166). 
The Respondent has in his possession marital property which he took 
with him at the time of separation. These items include a refrigerator, 
television, chest of drawers, laptop computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, 
the barometer, a crystal chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 
shop vacuums, saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the 
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the marriage 
including three (3), rifles, a revolver and reloading equipment. (R. 169-170). 
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for personal property in 
the possession of the other at the time of trial. The Petitioner and the 
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I 
Respondent acquired household furniture, fixtures, furnishings and 
appliances and other personal property during their marriage. (Exhibit 26, R. 
69-70). 
The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and stock benefits 
during the parties' marriage presently held by American Funds. (Exhibit 7). 
The Respondent deposited into a separate American Funds account 
approximately $32,045.00, which he claimed he inherited from his father in 
1999. The Respondent and the Petitioner created this account with 
American Funds in joint tenancy. (Exhibit 7, 7/16/04 Exhibit 3). Thereafter, 
the Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup truck with said funds from 
the joint American Funds account and this pickup truck was titled jointly 
with the Petitioner. The Respondent later sold the pickup truck and placed 
the proceeds of the sale into the American Funds account held in joint 
tenancy with the Petitioner. The Respondent also added a portion of his 
earnings during the marriage to this account. The funds in this account have 
been commingled and have not remained the separate property of the 
Respondent. (Tr. 95-96, R. 164-165). 
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The Petitioner and the Respondent incurred a single marital debt, the 
GMC credit card which was used for family purchases. (Exhibit 13, R. J65). 
The Petitioner, Judith Wanda Lowry, had incurred court costs and 
attorney fees through trial in the sum of $15,257.69. (R. 119-123). 
The trial court directed counsel for the Petitioner and the Respondent 
to prepare their proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and proposed 
orders and judgments at the trial on March 1,2005; (Tr. 94-98, R. 124). 
The Respondent, Kenneth Ray Lowry, submitted to the trial court the 
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Respondent's Proposed Judgment Dividing Property and Liabilities on April 
1,2005(# 144-147, 148-160); 
On April 8, 2005, Petitioner submitted Objections to [Respondent's] 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 161-174); 
On April 9, 2005, the Petitioner submitted her proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments to the trial court and to the 
Respondent. On April 22, 2005, Respondent filed Objection to Petitioner's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 184-190, 194); 
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On April 22, 2005, the Respondent filed his Response to Petitioner's 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
(R. 181-183); 
On July 20, 2005, the Respondent filed his Motion to Terminate 
Temporary Alimony (R. 242-243, 244-245); 
On July 26, 2005, the trial court sent the parties' counsel notice of a 
hearing upon the Respondent's Motion to Terminate Temporary Alimony 
scheduling a hearing for August 15, 2005 (R. 247-248); 
On August 15, 2005, the Petitioner and her counsel appeared before 
the trial court pursuant to the notice given by the Court for hearing. The 
Respondent and his counsel did not appear but had filed a motion to 
continue the hearing. The trial court denied the Respondent's motion to 
continue the hearing and made findings using the proposed findings, 
conclusions and orders, and the objections to the proposed findings and 
orders of both the Petitioner and the Respondent (8/1/05 Tr. 3-10); 
On August 17, 2005, the Petitioner submitted Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments to the Respondent and the 
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trial Court conforming to the findings and decisions of the trial court made 
on August 15, 2005 (R. 280-281); 
On August 25, 2005, the Respondent again filed his Objection to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments (R. 268-
269). The Respondent also filed his Motion to Reconsider Rulings claiming 
he had been denied due process of law because he was not present at the 
hearing scheduled by the Court for August 15, 2005, despite having received 
notice of the hearing (R. 270-274); 
On September 29, 2005, the trial court scheduled a hearing upon each 
of the parties' proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments for November 
1, 2005, and each parties' objections to the others documents. (R. 298-299); 
On November 1, 2005 the trial court held a hearing upon the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders and judgments proposed by the 
Petitioner and the Respondent, and upon the parties objections to each others 
proposed findings, conclusions and orders (R. 300, 11/01/05 Tr.1-12); 
On November 3, 2005, the trial court mailed to counsel for the 
Petitioner and the Respondent, the Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law which the court had modified and handwritten 
changes to the proposed findings (Addendum A); 
On November 17, 2005, the Petitioner's counsel mailed the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments, revised under the 
direction of the trial court, to the Respondent and to the trial court. These 
findings, conclusions, orders and judgments incorporated the changes the 
trial court had directed the Petitioner's counsel make to the documents on 
November 3,2005 (R. 303-327, 328-335); 
The trial court signed and entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Orders and Judgments on November 21,2005 (303-327, 328-335); 
On December 2, 2005, the Respondent filed his untimely Objection to 
Petitioner Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments. 
These objections were identical to the Respondent's objections and issues 
previously considered by the trial court in the Respondent's and the 
Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders and 
judgments, and the objections filed by both parties to the other parties 
proposed pleadings (338-343); 
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On December 12, 2005, the Petitioner filed her Reply to Respondent's 
Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and 
Judgments asserting that the objections raised by the Respondent were the 
same objections which the Respondent had raised twice before and which 
had been resolved by the trial court on November 1, and 3, 2005, following 
a hearing in the trial court upon the parties' proposed findings, and the 
parties objections thereto. The Petitioner also asserted that the Respondent's 
objections were untimely because they were not filed by November 25, 
2005, eight days after the findings, conclusions, orders and judgments were 
submitted to the trial court and the Respondent on November 17, 2005 
(R. 344-347); and 
Rather than bringing the issue of his untimely and previously resolved 
objections before the trial court for resolution the Respondent filed his 
Notice of Appeal on December 9,2005 (R. 348-349). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Petitioner 
should be affirmed. The appellant has failed to make a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
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effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The Appellee 
should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred upon this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Mr. Lowry had his days in court. His objections were repeatedly 
considered by the trial court and ruled upon thrice. He has not established 
that he was deprived of a single item of his property. Mr. Lowry was 
afforded, and re-afforded, due process of law. The trial court had heard his 
position at trial, twice considered his objections to the findings, orders and 
judgments and made modifications thereto based upon his objections. 
The Respondent and Appellant's argument that his right of due 
process under Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 7, of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is without merit and is frivolous. He cites 
no facts and no authority, nor makes an argument in his brief in support of 
his position. Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney 
fees upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and 
Judgments of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at 
trial support the valuation and disposition of the marital residence. The trial 
court considered the facts in the record and made the required findings 
necessary in valuing and disposing of the marital residence. The trial court 
was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the value of the 
marital residence. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than his 
mere dissatisfaction with the award does not show an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court valuing and dividing the marital residence. 
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's 
valuation and division of the marital residence should be affirmed. The 
Appellee should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred upon this 
appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at 
trial support the findings and the disposition of the joint American Funds 
account. The trial court considered and addressed the facts in the record 
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( 
and made the required findings necessary in determining whether the 
account had been commingled and had become marital property. The trial 
court was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the parties' 
use of the account. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than 
his mere dissatisfaction with the findings and award does not show an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court by finding the monies were marital property. 
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's 
findings and award of the joint American Funds account should be affirmed. 
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred 
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
The trial court's division of the personal property and single debt 
should be affirmed. The appellant has failed to make even a minimal effort 
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made 
no effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. Judith Lowry was 
awarded nothing more than one-half (1/2), of the value of the marital assets. 
The trial court's division of the marital assets and debt should be affirmed. 
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred 
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
THE ARGUMENTS 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
AND SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED 
THE PETITIONER ATTORNEY FEES 
The Respondent and Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, challenges the 
trial court's award of partial attorney fees to the Petitioner and Appellee, 
Judith Wanda Lowry. Mr. Lowry urges this Court to reverse the trial court's 
award of attorney fees to Mrs. Lowry because Mr. Lowry incurred his own 
attorney fees and because the trial court "failed to take into account the 
Appellant's own expenses in determining the Appellant's ability to pay 
attorney's fees." 
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< 
The appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact and 
he only makes a cursory attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to Judith Lowry. In BoUiger v. 
BoUiger, 997 P.2d 903 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), this Court held that an award 
of attorney fees will be upheld where there is no challenge by the appellant 
to any of the findings of fact entered by the trial court in support of the 
award of attorney fees. 
Not only does the appellant not challenge the trial court's factual 
findings in support of the award of attorney fees, he fails to marshal "every 
scrap of competent evidence" in the record in support of the trial court's 
decision to award Judith Lowry partial attorney fees and "ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence," and demonstrate how the trial court's award of 
attorney fees is "clearly erroneous." In West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991), this Court states: 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent 
array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
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convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
See also, McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 
1992)(appellant failed to demonstrate, after marshaling the evidence, that the 
trial court's findings were clearly erroneous), and Stewart v. Board of 
Review, 831 P.2d 134, 138 ((Utah App. 1992)(Once the evidence is listed or 
marshaled with appropriate citation to the record, the appellant must then 
demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable 
to the decision). 
On April 1, 2005, a month after the trial, the Respondent's counsel 
filed an affidavit of attorney fees the trial court presumably considered, 
when it awarded the Petitioner her costs and attorney fees. (R. 127-140) 
The appellant claims the trial court "failed to take into account the 
Appellant's own expenses in determining the Appellant's ability to pay 
attorney's fees." The statement is simply untrue and frivolous. Mr. Lowry, 
submitted Exhibits 19, and 20, to the trial court which listed his expenses 
and was examined at trial upon the exhibits in detail. Respondent's Exhibits 
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19, 20, Tr. 14, 90-94. The exhibits listed his expenses for the years 2003, 
" 
2004, and 2005. Additionally, Mr. Lowry's friend, fellow employee, and 
office manager at Century 21, Russell Gwilliam, was examined regarding 
which of the office expenses Mr. Lowry pays, those paid by Century 21, and 
the trial court considered his testimony. Tr.62-66. 
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of many other facts in the 
record, not listed or marshaled by Mr. Lowry in his brief, which supported 
the award of attorney fees to Judith Lowry. For example, the length of the 
marriage (Tr. 10), Judith Lowry's monthly living expenses and income (Tr. 
10-11, Petitioner's Exhibits 27, 12), Mr. Lowry's medical condition (Tr. 11, 
22-26), Mr. Lowry's social security income (Tr. 11, 27), Mr. Lowry's 
Century 21 income (Tr. 12, 22, 27, Exhibits 10, 18, 31), Mr. Lowry's other 
recent income (Exhibit 8), the retirement which had not been distributed (Tr. 
15-16), Mrs. Lowry's total disability and extensive medical problems (Tr. 
18-22, Exhibit 6), Mr. Lowry's expenses, debts and obligations (Tr. 27-28, 
Exhibits 13, 19, 24, 28), Mrs. Lowry's attorneys fees and costs (Tr. 41, R. 
119-123), Mr. Lowry's attorney fees and costs which the trial court 
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presumably considered because they were part of the record at the time of 
the entry of the findings of fact and judgments. (R. 127-140). 
The appellant merely presents a few selected facts in support of his 
own position omitting many facts supporting the trial courts award of 
attorney fees to Judith Lowry. The appellant has not properly marshaled, "in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence" 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
West Valley City v. Majesic Inv. Co., id. 
Just as importantly, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court's findings and decision were clearly erroneous, or otherwise 
legally insufficient, when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light 
most favorable to the decision. Stewart, id.; McPehrson, id. 
All of the trial court's findings of fact support the award of attorney 
fees and costs to Judith Lowry. (R. 303-327) The trial court considered and 
addressed the facts in the record and made the three required findings 
necessary in awarding attorney's fees, i.e., the receiving spouse's financial 
need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees, (R. 303-327), and was cognizant of and considered the trial 
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< 
testimony and many exhibits identified above. Mr. Lowry's argument based 
upon nothing more than his dissatisfaction with the award does not show an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court awarding Judith Lowry a portion of her 
attorney fees in the action. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
Mr. Lowry has failed to make even a minimal effort to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and he has made no effort, 
and failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly 
erroneous. The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The 
trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to Judith Wanda Lowry should 
be affirmed. Mrs. Lowry should be awarded her attorney fees incurred upon 
this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maughan v. Maughcm, 
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
THE APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS IN THE 
TRIAL COURT. HE WAIVED HIS OBJECTIONS BY UNTIMELY 
FILING THE OBJECTIONS AND FAILING TO PROPERLY BRING 
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR RESOLUTION 
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The Respondent and Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, contends that he 
was denied his right of due process guaranteed by Article 1, Section 7, of the 
Utah Constitution because the trial court executed the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgment four days after the mailing of the 
documents to the trial court and Respondent's counsel. (R. 303-327, 328-
335.) 
"Due process of law" requires that, before one can be bound by a 
judgment affecting his property rights, some process must be served upon 
him which in some degree at lease is calculated to give him notice. Naisbitt 
v. Herrick, 290 P. 950 (Utah 1930). See also, Christensen v. Harris, 163 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1945)(a party shall have his day in court.) 
The Appellant's claim is untrue, meritless and frivolous. A review of 
the record reveals the following: 
The trial court directed counsel for the Petitioner and the Respondent 
to prepare their proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and proposed 
orders and judgments at the trial on March 1,2005; (Tr. 94-98, R. 124). 
The Respondent, Kenneth Ray Lowry, submitted to the trial court the 
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
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Respondent's Proposed Judgment Dividing Property and Liabilities on April 
1,2005 (ft 144-147, 148-160); 
On April 8, 2005, the Petitioner submitted her Objections to Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 161-174); 
On April 9, 2005, the Petitioner submitted her proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments to the trial court and to the 
Respondent. On April 22, 2005, Respondent filed Objection to Petitioner's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 184-190, 194); 
On April 22, 2005, the Respondent filed his Response to Petitioner's 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
(R. 181-183); 
On July 20, 2005, the Respondent filed his Motion to Terminate 
Temporary Alimony and supported the motion with the Affidavit of Kenneth 
Lowry (R. 242-243, 244-245); 
On July 26, 2005, the trial court sent the parties' counsel notice of a 
hearing upon the Respondent's Motion to Terminate Temporary Alimony 
scheduling a hearing for August 15, 2005 (R. 247-248); 
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On August 15, 2005, the Petitioner and her counsel appeared before 
the trial court pursuant to the notice given by the Court for hearing. The 
Respondent and his counsel did not appear but had filed a motion to 
continue the hearing. The trial court denied the Respondent's motion to 
continue the hearing and made findings using the proposed findings, 
conclusions and orders, and the objections to the proposed findings and 
o 
orders of both the Petitioner and the Respondent (8/1/05 Tr. 3-10); 
On August 17, 2005, the Petitioner submitted Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments to the Respondent and the 
trial Court conforming to the findings and decisions of the trial court on 
August 15, 2005 (R. 280-281); 
On August 25, 2005, the Respondent again filed his Objection to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments (R. 268-
269). The Respondent also filed his Motion to Reconsider Rulings claiming 
he had been denied due process of law because he was not present at the 
hearing scheduled by the Court for August 15, 2005, despite having received 
notice of the hearing (R. 270-274); 
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On September 29, 2005, the trial court scheduled another hearing 
upon the proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments for November 1, 
2005 (R. 298-299). On November 1, 2005 the trial court held a hearing 
upon the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders and judgments 
proposed by the Petitioner and the Respondent, and upon the parties 
objections to each others proposed findings (R. 300, 11/01/05 Tr.1-12); 
On November 3, 2005, the trial court mailed to counsel for the 
Petitioner and the Respondent the Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which the court had handwritten changes to the 
proposed findings and conclusions. {Addendum A); 
On November 17, 2005, the Petitioner's counsel mailed the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments, revised under the 
direction of the trial court, to the Respondent and to the trial court. (R. 303-
327, 328-335); 
The trial court signed and entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Orders and Judgments on November 21, 2005 (303-327, 328-335); 
On December 2, 2005, the Respondent filed his untimely Objection to 
Petitioner Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgments. 
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These objections were identical to the Respondent's objections and issues 
previously considered by the trial court in the Respondent's and the 
Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders and 
judgments, and the objections filed by both parties to the other parties 
proposed pleadings (338-343); 
On December 12, 2005, the Petitioner filed her Reply to Respondent's 
Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and 
Judgments asserting that the objections raised by the Respondent were the 
same objections which the Respondent had raised twice before and which 
had been resolved by the trial court on November 1, and 3, 2005, following 
a hearing upon the parties' proposed findings, and the parties objections 
thereto. The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent's objections were 
untimely because they were not filed by November 25, 2005, eight days 
after the findings, conclusions, orders and judgments were submitted to the 
trial court and the Respondent on November 17,2005 (R.344-347); and 
Rather than bringing the issue of his untimely and previously resolved 
objections before the trial court for resolution the Respondent filed his 
Notice of Appeal on December 9, 2005 (R. 348-349). 
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The appellant, Kenneth Lowry, does not present nor cite any authority 
supporting his position that he was deprived of his property in violation of 
Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah in violation of Rule 33, of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Mr. Lowry does not make any argument whatsoever in his 
Appellant's Brief in support of his position that he was deprived of his 
property without due process of law in violation of Rule 33, of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Mr. Lowry has not established that he was deprived of any "property" 
at all. He has not specifically identified anything, not a single item, of 
property that he was deprived of. Indeed, the properties awarded to Judith 
Lowry were her fair share of the marital assets, jointly acquired and owned, 
and possessed by her. The appellant, Mr. Lowry, has failed to establish a 
principal element of his claim under Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution 
of Utah, the property of which he was deprived. 
Moreover, the appellant Mr. Lowry was afforded due process of law 
upon his objections to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and 
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Judgments entered by the trial court under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Although Rule 7(f)(2), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that the Respondent, Mr. Lowry, file objections within five days (eight with 
the mailing rule), he failed to do so. Mr. Lowry untimely filed his written 
objections to the third revised set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Orders and Judgment on December 2, 2005. (338-343). These objections 
were the same objections the trial court had twice previously ruled upon. 
Mr. Lowry had his days in court. His objections were repeatedly 
considered by the trial court and ruled upon thrice. He has not established 
that he was deprived of a single item of his property. Mr. Lowry was 
afforded, and re-afforded, due process of law. The trial court had heard his 
position at trial, twice considered his objections to the findings, orders and 
judgments and made modifications and revisions based upon his objections. 
The trial court, upon receiving the third set of revised Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments, determined that the 
documents were in accord with the Court's intentions in the action and 
executed and entered them in good discretion. 
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The Respondent and Appellant's argument that his right of due 
process under Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 7, of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is without merit and is frivolous and the 
findings and orders should be affirmed. He cites no facts and no authority 
nor makes an argument in his brief in support of his position. Judith Wanda 
Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees upon this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Eames v. 
Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 
156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
AND SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
PROPERTY VALUATION AND DIVISION. THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION VALUING AND DIVIDING 
THE MARITAL RESIDENCE 
The Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, contends that the trial court erred 
in the valuation of the marital residence by allowing the testimony of the 
Appellee's appraiser and by ignoring the Appellant's $8,000.00, contribution 
of inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence. 
The appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact and 
he only makes a cursory attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the 
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trial court's award valuation of the marital residence. In Proudflt v. 
Proudfit, 598 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1979), this Court held that an appellant must 
establish that the trial court abused it's discretion in valuing and disposing of 
a marital residence in a divorce action. See also Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
Not only does the appellant not challenge the trial court's factual 
findings in support of the valuation and disposition of the marital residence, 
he fails to marshal "every scrap of competent evidence" in the record in 
support of the trial court's decision valuing and dividing the marital 
residence and "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence," and demonstrate how 
the trial court's valuation and disposition of the marital residence is "clearly 
erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991). See also, McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 
App. 1992)(appellant failed to demonstrate, after marshaling the evidence, 
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous), and Stewart v. Board 
of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 138 ((Utah App. 1992)(Once the evidence is listed 
or marshaled with appropriate citation to the record, the appellant must then 
demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
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findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable 
to the decision). 
Importantly, the both the Respondent and the Petitioner presented 
extensive testimony and evidence to the trial court at trial upon the valuation 
and disposition of the marital residence.(7>. 5-9, 27, 30, 43-45, 45-50, 50-60) 
The appellant claims the trial court "failed to take into account the 
Appellant's own valuation and his "expert witness" testimony in 
determining the value of the marital residence, Mr. Gwilliam, his friend, 
fellow employee and office manager at Century 21. The statement is simply 
untrue and frivolous. Mr. Lowry presented Mr. Gwilliam as his "expert 
witness" upon the value of the marital residence. (There was no prior notice 
to the Petitioner under Rule 26, that Mr. Gwilliam would be presented by the 
Respondent as an "expert witness" at the time of trial.) 
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of many other facts in the 
record, not listed or marshaled by Mr. Lowry in his brief, which supported 
the trial court's valuation and division of the marital residence. For 
example, the length of the marriage {Tr. 10), Judith Lowry's monthly living 
expenses and income {Tr. 10-11, Petitioner's Exhibits 27, 12), Mr. Lowry's 
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medical condition (Tr. 11, 22-26), Mr. Lowry's social security income (Tr. 
11, 27), Mr. Lowry's Century 21 income (Tr. 12, 22, 27, Exhibits 10, 18, 
31), Mr. Lowry's other recent income (Exhibit 8), the retirement which had 
not been distributed (Tr. 15-16), Mrs. Lowry's total disability and extensive 
medical problems (Tr. 18-22, Exhibit 6), Mr. Lowry's expenses, debts and 
obligations (Tr. 27-28, Exhibits 13, 19, 24, 28), Mr. Lowry's valuation of the 
residence, Mr. Gwilliam's valuation of the residence, and Mr. Morley's 
valuation of the residence. (R. 27, 30, 43-45, 45-50, 50-60). It was within 
the trial court's discretion to value the residence at $185,000.00. 
There was no evidence whatsoever presented at trial that the 
Appellant, Mr. Lowry, had made an $8,000.00, contribution to the purchase 
of the marital residence from his inherited, separate property. Indeed, the 
trial court found that Mr. Lowry's inheritance had been commingled with 
the marital estate when he placed the funds into a joint American Funds 
account with Mrs. Lowry, used the funds to purchase automobiles and trucks 
which the parties jointly titled, deposited his earnings into the account, and 
used the monies for trips and household expenses. (R. 313). 
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The appellant merely presents a few selected facts in support of his 
own position omitting many facts supporting the trial courts valuation and 
disposition of the marital residence. The appellant has not properly 
marshaled, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence" introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., id. 
Just as importantly, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court's findings and decision were clearly erroneous, or otherwise 
legally insufficient, when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light 
most favorable to the decision. Stewart, id.; McPehrson, id. 
"The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and 
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Savage v. Savage, 658 
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). In particular, the "[d]etermination of the 
value of assets is a matter for the trial court which will not be reviewed in 
the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 
(Utah 1982)." Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984). 
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All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at 
trial support the valuation and disposition of the marital residence. (7>. 27, 
30, 43-45, 45-50, 50-60). The trial court considered and addressed the facts 
in the record and made the required findings necessary in valuing and 
disposing of the marital residence. The trial court was cognizant of and 
considered the trial testimony about the value of the marital residence. Mr. 
Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than his mere dissatisfaction 
with the award does not show an abuse of discretion by the trial court 
valuing and dividing the marital residence. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah Ct App. 1993). Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). Turner, id.; Argyle, id. 
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's 
valuation and division of the marital residence should be affirmed. Judith 
Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred upon 
this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maughan v. Maughan, 
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
AND SHOW THAT THE FINDINGS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
THE RESPONDENT'S INHERITANCE HAD BEEN COMMINGLED 
AND WAS MARITAL PROPERTY 
The Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, asserts that the trial court 
committed err in awarding the Appellee, Judith Wanda Lowry, a portion of 
his inheritance. 
The appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact and 
he only makes a cursory attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and decision that the $32,045.00, in the joint American 
Funds account was marital property because it had been commingled. In 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court 
held that once inherited property is so commingled that it loses it's separate 
identity it is marital property. 
Not only does the appellant not challenge the trial court's factual 
findings in support of the trial court's finding that the funds were 
commingled and marital property, he fails to marshal "every scrap of 
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competent evidence" in the record in support of the trial court's decision and 
findings that the account was commingled and marital property, and "ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence," and demonstrate how the trial court's 
finding that the inheritance was commingled is clearly erroneous. West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). See also, 
McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992); Stewart v. 
Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134,138 ((Utah App. 1992.) 
Importantly, both the Respondent presented extensive argument, 
testimony and evidence to the trial court at trial upon the issue of whether 
the $32,045.00, which the parties had placed into a joint American Funds 
account had been commingled and was thus marital property. (Tr. 95-96, 
Trial Exhibits 7, and 25, R. 144-160, 170-172, 188, 324-325). 
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of many other facts in the 
record, not listed or marshaled by Mr. Lowry in his brief, which supported 
the trial court's finding that the joint American Funds account had been 
commingled and was marital property. For example, trial exhibit 7, showed 
the funds had been placed into a joint account with Judith Lowry. The 
parties had purchased the parties' Cadillac and GMC pickup truck with the 
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funds and titled the vehicles in both parties' names jointly. The truck was 
sold and the proceeds placed back into the joint American Funds account. 
Mr. Lowry had put his marital earnings into the joint account, the parties had 
taken trips using the funds and the parties had paid living expenses out of the 
account. 
There was no evidence whatsoever presented at trial that the 
Appellant, Mr. Lowry, had maintained the funds as his inherited, separate 
property. Indeed, the trial court found that Mr. Lowry's inheritance had 
been commingled with the marital estate when he placed the funds into a 
joint American Funds account with Mrs. Lowry, used the funds to purchase 
automobiles and trucks which the parties jointly titled, deposited his 
earnings into the account, and used the monies for trips and household 
expenses. (R. 313). 
The appellant merely presents a few selected facts in support of his 
own position omitting many facts supporting the trial courts findings and 
decision that the joint American Funds account had been commingled and 
was marital property. The appellant has not properly marshaled, "in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence" 
19. 
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introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
West Valley City v. Majesic Inv. Co., id. In fact, the appellant, Kenneth 
Lowry, presented no evidence at trial that he had maintained his inheritance 
separately from the interests of his wife, nor did he provide any evidence to 
the trial court that the monies could be traced to his inheritance. (Tr. 1-98). 
All of the facts presented to the trial court preponderate against Mr. Lowry's 
position. 
Just as importantly, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court's findings and decision were clearly erroneous, or otherwise 
legally insufficient, when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light 
most favorable to the decision. Stewart, id.; McPehrson, id. 
"The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and 
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Savage v. Savage, 658 
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 
1984). 
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at 
trial support the findings and the disposition of the joint American Funds 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
account. The trial court considered and addressed the facts in the record 
and made the required findings necessary in determining whether the 
account had been commingled and had become marital property. The trial 
court was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the parties' 
use of the account. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than 
his mere dissatisfaction with the findings and award does not show an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court it's finding that the monies were marital 
property. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct App. 1993). Childs v. 
Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999). Turner, id.; Argyle, id. 
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's 
findings and award of the joint American Funds account should be affirmed. 
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred 
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
/ in 
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Procedure. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maughan 
v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
AND SHOW THE FINDINGS AND DECISION ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S 
DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF PERSONAL PROPERY AND 
MARITAL DEBT 
The Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry, challenges the trial court's 
division of certain items of personal property and debt. He challenges the 
award to Judith Lowry of one-half (1/2), of the value of the funds in the 
State Bank of Southern Utah, one-half (1/2), of the value of the parties 
jointly titled 2000 GMC pickup truck, the award of the 2002 Toyota Camry 
(together with the debt thereon) to Judith, and the insurance proceeds from 
the crash of the 1997 Cadillac Deville, which were used by Mrs. Lowry as a 
down payment on the Toyota Camry. He also challenges the order that he 
pay the only debt of the parties', the GMC credit card, which was used for 
family and household expenses. 
The appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact and 
he only makes a cursory attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the 
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trial court's award division of the personal property and debt. Hall v. Hall, 
858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Not only does the appellant not challenge the trial court's factual 
findings in support of the disposition of the personal property and debt, he 
fails to marshal "every scrap of competent evidence" in the record in support 
of the trial court's decision dividing the personal property and debt and 
"ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence," and demonstrate how the trial 
court's disposition of the property and debt is "clearly erroneous." West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). See 
also, McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992)(appellant 
failed to demonstrate, after marshaling the evidence, that the trial court's 
findings were clearly erroneous), and Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 
134, 138 ((Utah App. 1992)(Once the evidence is listed or marshaled with 
appropriate citation to the record, the appellant must then demonstrate that 
the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when 
viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the 
decision). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Importantly, the both the Respondent and the Petitioner presented 
extensive testimony and evidence to the trial court at trial upon the 
disposition of the personal property and debt. He made no claim for 
personal property at the time of trial (Tr. 5-9, 27, 30, 43-45, 45-50, 50-60). 
Moreover, the trial court was cognizant of many other facts in the 
record, not listed or marshaled by Mr. Lowry in his brief, which supported 
the trial court's division of the marital assets and debt. For example, the 
length of the marriage (Tr. 10), Judith Lowry's monthly living expenses and 
income (Tr. 10-11, Petitioner's Exhibits 27, 12), Mr. Lowry's medical 
condition (Tr. 11, 22-26), Mr. Lowry's social security income (Tr. 11, 27), 
Mr. Lowry's Century 21 income (Tr. 12, 22, 27, Exhibits 10, 18, 31), Mr. 
Lowry's other recent income (Exhibit 8), the retirement which had not been 
distributed (Tr. 15-16), Mrs. Lowry's total disability and extensive medical 
problems (Tr. 18-22, Exhibit 6), Mr. Lowry's expenses, debts and 
obligations (Tr. 27-28, Exhibits 13, 19, 24, 28), the crash of the 1997 
Cadillac, the purchase of and debt upon the 2002 Toyota Camry by using the 
insurance proceeds as a down payment thereon, and the commingling of the 
inherited funds the Appellant contends were used to purchase the jointly 
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titled 1997 Cadillac. (Exhibits 7, 21, 28, 27, 29, 30; Tr. 95-97). It was 
within the trial court's discretion to divide the personal property and debts in 
the fashion that it did. 
The appellant merely presents a few selected facts in support of his 
own position omitting many facts supporting the trial courts disposition of 
the personal property and the single debt, the GMC credit card. The 
appellant has not properly marshaled, "in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence" introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Mqjesic Inv. Co., 
id. 
Just as importantly, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court's findings and decision were clearly erroneous, or otherwise 
legally insufficient, when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light 
most favorable to the decision. Stewart, id.; McPehrson, id. 
"The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and 
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Savage v. Savage, 658 
44 
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P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982)." 
Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468,470 (Utah 1984). 
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at 
trial support the disposition of the personal property and debt. (Tr. 27, 30, 
43-45, 45-50, 50-60). The trial court considered and addressed the facts in 
the record and made the required findings necessary in disposing of the 
personal property and debt. The trial court was cognizant of and considered 
the trial testimony and each parties' positions respecting the division of 
personal property and the single debt of the parties. Mr. Lowry's argument 
based upon nothing more than his mere dissatisfaction with the award does 
not show an abuse of discretion by the trial court dividing the marital assets 
and debt. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct App. 1993). Childs v. 
Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999). Turner, id.; Argyle, id. 
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. Judith Lowry was 
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awarded nothing more than oile-half (1/2), of the value of the marital assets. 
The trial court's division of the marital assets and debt should be affirmed. 
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred 
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
o 
Procedure. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Gt. App. 1987); Maughan 
v. Maughan, 710 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's 
award of attorney fees and costs to Judith Wanda Lowry should be affirmed. 
Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred 
upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Mr. Lowry had his days in court. His objections were repeatedly 
considered by the trial court and ruled upon thrice. He has not established 
that he was deprived of a single item of his property. Mr. Lowry was 
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afforded, and re-afforded, due process of law. The trial court had heard his 
position at trial, twice considered his objections to the findings, orders and 
judgments and made modifications and revisions thereto based upon his 
objections. 
Mr. Lowry's argument that his right of due process under Article I, 
Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 7, of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is without merit and is frivolous. He cites no facts and no 
authority nor makes an argument in his brief in support of his position. 
Judith Wanda Lowry, should be awarded her costs and attorney fees upon 
this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Orders and Judgments of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at 
trial support the valuation and disposition of the marital residence. The trial 
court considered the facts in the record and made the required findings 
necessary in valuing and disposing of the marital residence. The trial court 
was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the value of the 
marital residence. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than his 
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mere dissatisfaction with the award does not show an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court valuing and dividing the marital residence. 
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's 
valuation and division of the marital residence should be affirmed. Judith 
Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred upon 
this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
All of the trial court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at 
trial support the findings and the disposition of the joint American Funds 
account. The trial court considered and addressed the facts in the record 
and made the required findings necessary in determining whether the 
account had been commingled and had become marital property. The trial 
court was cognizant of and considered the trial testimony about the parties' 
use of the account. Mr. Lowry's argument based upon nothing more than 
his mere dissatisfaction with the findings and award does not show an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court it's finding that the monies were marital 
48 
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property. The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, and he has made 
no effort, and failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly 
erroneous. The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The 
trial court's findings and award of the joint American Funds account should 
be affirmed. Judith Wanda Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney 
fees incurred upon this appeal pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
The appellant has wholly failed to make even a minimal effort to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and has made no 
effort to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
The appeal upon this issue is frivolous and without merit. The trial court's 
division of the marital assets and debt should be affirmed. Judith Wanda 
Lowry should be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred pursuant to 
Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of September, 2006. 
ANDREW B. BERRY, 
Attorney for Petitiojrer and 
Judith Wanda Lo> 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of September, 2006, I served 
upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, to Reed R. Braithwaite, of 
Ascione, Heideman &McKay, LLC, attorneys for Respondent and 
Appellant, Kenneth Ray Lowry,^ atJiX-East-U}Q_South, Suite 101, St. George, 
Utah 84770. 
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ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB #0309 
Attorney for Judith Wanda Lowry 
39 West Main Street 
Post Office Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 435 436-8200 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
JUDITH WANDA LOWRY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KENNETH RAY LOWRY, 
Respondent, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 044500246 
Assigned to: 
Honorable James L. Shumate 
—--ooOoo -
This action came on for a regularly scheduled trial on 
the 1st day of March, 2005, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County within 
the State of Utah. The Petitioner and the Respondent were present 
and represented by their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and Gary G. 
Kuhlmann, respectively. The parties presented their documentary 
evidence and witnesses and the Court examined the Petitioner and 
the Respondent. The Petitioner and the Respondent each presented 
proposed findings of fact, orders and judgments to the Court and 
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filed objections thereto. THE COURT, upon the pleadings on file 
herein, the witnesses and documentary evidence presented by the 
parties and with good cause appearing therefore, now makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner and the Respondent were residents of 
the County of Washington within the State of Utah for three (3), 
months prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. The Petitioner and the Respondent were married on the 
20th day of August, 1960, in City of Dalton within the State of 
Massachusetts, and have been married in the LDS Temple and have 
since remained husband and wife, a period of nearly forty-three 
(43), years. This is a marriage of long-term. 
3. The Respondent refused to give the Petitioner 
physical affection for several months prior to the parties' 
separation and told the parties' children he wanted a divorce from 
the Petitioner. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial 
to find that the Respondent was having an extra-marital affair. On 
March 12, 2004, two days after the Respondent had heart surgery, 
the Petitioner and the Respondent had an argument and the 
Petitioner was driving to Salt Lake to. visit her children. The 
Petitioner called the Respondent and asked if she should return 
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home to work out the problem. The Respondent told the Petitioner 
to "keep going North and don't come home." The Respondent has told 
the Petitioner that he wants a divorce. The Petitioner did not 
want the divorce and requested the Respondent attend marriage 
counseling which he refused. Irreconcilable differences exist 
between the parties rendering this marriage no longer viable and 
making reconciliation impossible. 
4. Four (4), children were born as issue of the 
Petitioner and the Respondent. All of said children are adults and 
are fully emancipated and are not dependent upon the parties for 
their support. 
5. The Petitioner retired from the Shepard Montana 
School District in 1994. She receives retirement income from the 
State of Montana in the sum of One Hundred Eighty Dollars Seventy-
three Cents ($180.73), per .month. The Petitioner also received 
Social Security income at the time of trial in the sum of Six 
Hundred Thirty-five Dollars ($635.00), per month, but this sum has 
since been reduced by Seventy-three Dollars ($73.00), per month 
since trial and the Petitioner now receives social security income 
of Five Hundred Sixty-two ($562.00), per month.. The Petitioner is 
completely disabled. She has had six (6), foot surgeries resulting 
from peripheral neuropathy, is in need of further surgeries and 
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suffers in continuous pain. The Petitioner has also had surgery 
fusing the vertebrae in her neck which causes the Petitioner 
continuous pain. The Petitioner suffers from arthritis and is in 
present need of cataract surgery. Becky Torgerson of the State of 
Utah Office of Rehabilitation assessed the Petitioner and 
determined that the Petitioner is disabled which prevents her from 
engaging in full-time gainful employment and it is highly 
questionable whether the Petitioner can engage in even part-time 
employment. Becky Torgerson was subpoenaed by the Petitioner to 
testify as to the Petitioner's complete disability but was released 
from the subpoena at trial because the parties stipulated that the 
Petitioner was completely disabled. The Petitioner is receiving 
both physical therapy and other therapy, and the copay cost thereof 
is One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120.00), per month. 
6. The Respondent receives Social Security income in 
excess of One Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per 
month. The Respondent deposited into the parties joint bank 
account iaaaBfi^ fegJlS tJEZSS&ti&rrts and his social security from June, 
2003, through April, 2004, the eleven (11), months prior to the 
parties' separation, in the sum of $42,265.35, which averages 
$3,842.30, per month. These deposits did not include his income 
from his employment at Century 21 Real Estate nor the Petitioner's 
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social security and retirement income. 
The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21, into 
the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties marriage. On 
July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a 
commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2004, which he had deposited 
into his personal account at the State Bank of Southern Utah and 
that all of the funds in this account were his. The Respondent had 
also deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at 
Zions Bank. Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Order Arising from 
Order to Show Cause Hearing refer to these accounts and ordered the 
division of these accounts reserved for trial and any amounts 
withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the 
time of trial. The Petitioner was paid a lump sum payment of Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), following the hearing upon the her 
order to show cause. 
In any event, the monies in the accounts were marital 
property having been earned by the Respondent during the marriage 
from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 21, where 
he had been employed since 2002. The Petitioner and the Respondent 
should each be awarded one-half {H), of the value of the accounts 
at Southern Utah State Bank and Zions Bank and all other accounts 
existing at the time of the hearing upon the Order to Show Cause. 
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7. The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had 
stints placed in his heart and has other medical problems^ jasft 
dSaaLLnSi gnn'^ r^irjr7^ xr!rrjr^ r'^  ' The Respondent is presently employed 
as a real estate agent at Century 21, in St. George, Utah. His 
adjusted gross income from his 1099, at Century 21 in the year 
2004, was Forty-seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-six Dollars 
Forty-three Cents ($47,276.43), although one of the commissions 
earned by the Respondent in the amount of Twenty-seven Thousand Six 
Hundred Dollars ($27,600.00), was an unusual event. The 
Respondent's average monthly income from Century 21, alone for the 
year. 2004, was Three Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-nine Dollars 
Seventy Cents ($3,939.70). The Court finds that the Respondent's 
eaw* ? uc, tdfl £ C ' ^y tj Jf u~i} i r A fa \/ hf ^ 
-^outh^-^mom^ is potrr- Tnouoand Five m 
la e-tf ^ A -£ f<p£ djs4 
1
 Dollars^  
* (jet ViJ/ikJ sL^fj 
The ri"iMrinni1-nTTr^ "in1"iriii t t ed h i s Exh ib i t 19, which purp£SFted 
to i temize h i s employment expenses. The Respondent J^e^ t i f i ed t h a t 
the expenses l i s t e d on Exhibi t 19, were foj^the yea rs 2003, 2004 
and 2005, and t h a t some of the expen^elf l i s t e d were pa id by Century 
2 1 . Several o the r expenses^ /e re one-t ime c o s t s such as a l ap top 
computer and automo^irle r e p a i r s t o h i s v e h i c l e which he uses both 
for employjnerTf: and pe rsona l use . Many o t h e r expenses were l i s t e d 
than QUO^—err—wer ^ d u p l i c a t e d (such as t a x payments and aulTo" 
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r p p a i r s . ) -JIlt^r^k^A|:l)C)rK]^nl. gribare 1 i rrhmri nn - rm expense on Kxhil 
the spousal support he has been payingL^t^w^^titioner since the 
entry of thB^¥^f^nxyT3irV0rder in this action. 
8. The Petitioner's monthly living expenses are Three 
Thousand Three Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine Cents ($3,304.89), 
per month. Her monthly need for financial or spousal support from 
the Respondent (following the deduction of her monthly social 
security and' retirement income in the sum of $742.73) is Two 
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-nine Dollars Sixteen Cents 
($2,489.16), per month. 
The Respondent has fete ability to pay said sum as spousal 
support from hi s *£te»ei^ jygaettja ty «Hffgn n^pffy+frraan** j nr.nmp and from-dixs* 
effiiafTjy^iCMit in£>pm£L^QLL^ The Petitioner is entitled to 
maintain the standard of living to which the parties have become 
accustomed ^ tod this is a long-term marriage. The Petitioner should 
be awarded ftOjaaoanaBt spousal support which should be paid by the 
Respondent in the ^ ura^^jTrr^
 r per month 
on the 1st day of each month hereafter and said sum is to be paid 
from and after tteds^ a. 1, 2005, A*kx±^< efrary=gg^ teff&s&', to the Petitioner 
by the Respondent. 
9. The Petitioner and the Respondent purchased a 
residence and real property in October, 2002, and during the 
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marriage situate at 1020 East Fort Pierce Drive in the City of St. 
George in the County of Washington within the State of Utah. The 
purchase price of the parties' home and real property was One 
Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00). U.S. Bank is 
owed Eighty-two Thousand Forty-two Dollars Seventy-one Cents 
($82,042.71), as of the date of trial and the payment thereon is 
Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638.91), per 
month. 
The Petitioner testified that the present fair market 
value of the marital residence and real property at the time of 
trial was One Hundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00). 
On February 24, 2005, Craig Morley, a licensed, certified 
and accredited real estate appraiser of Morley & McConkie, L.C., 
performed an appraisal of the marital residence and real property. 
Mr. Morley was qualified as an expert witness as to the value of 
the parties' residence and real property. Mr. Morley determined 
and testified that the fair market value of the parties' residence 
and real property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred Eighty-
five Thousand Dollars ($185,000.00). Accordingly, the parties have 
just less than One Hundred Three Thousand Dollars ($103,000.00), of 
equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner 
paid Eight Thousand Dollars, ($8,000.00), from her separate 
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inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and 
real property. 
The Petitioner should be awarded the ownership and all 
right, title and interest in and to said residence and real 
property subject only to the Respondent's lien for his share of the 
equity therein in the sum of Forty-seven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($47,500.00). The Respondent shall forthwith quit claim 
the ownership and all right, title and interest in the marital 
residence and real property to the Petitioner. The Petitioner 
shall pay the outstanding debt to U.S. Bank on the residence and 
real property. The Petitioner needs to live in the residence 
because of her health problems and shall be entitled to live in the 
residence until she dies, or sells the marital residence and real 
property. The sale of the marital residence and real property 
should be in the Petitioner's sole discretion. The Petitioner 
shall not be required to pay the Respondent's lien upon the marital 
residence and real property until she sells the residence and real 
property,^ In the event the Petitioner chooses not to sell the 
residence and real property during her lifetime and the Respondent 
dies prior to the payment of his equity lien, said equity lien 
shall become an asset of the Respondent's estate. 
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10. The Respondent has in his possession marital 
property which he took with him at the time of separation. These 
items include a refrigerator, television, chest of drawers, laptop 
computer, lounging chairs, a green desk, the barometer, a crystal 
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums, 
saws, drills and several other tools, all purchased during the 
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the 
marriage including 3 rifles, a revolver and reloading equipment. 
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for personal 
property in the possession of the other at the time of trial. The 
Petitioner and the Respondent acquired household furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal property 
during their marriage which have been divided between the parties 
and which should be awarded pursuant to this division except as 
otherwise ordered herein. 
11. Each party should be awarded his or her personal 
effects. 
12. The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and 
stock benefits during the parties' marriage which are presently 
held by American Funds. These funds have not yet been divided 
although the Petitioner's counsel has submitted a Domestic 
Relations Order for execution by the Court. The Respondent shall 
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forthwith execute all documents necessary to effectuate the 
division of all of the American Funds Accounts specifically, but 
not limited to, an IRA Distribution Request form provided to the 
Respondent's counsel by the Petitioner's counsel on' January 4, 
2005, which requires the Respondent's signature guarantee in 
Section 7. The guaranteed signature of the Respondent is required 
before American Funds can distribute the Respondent's pension and 
retirement IRAs, and the Respondent shall do so forthwith. 
13. The Respondent deposited into a separate American 
Funds account approximately $32,045.00, which he claims he 
inherited from his father in 1999. The Respondent and the 
Petitioner created this account with American Funds in joint 
tenancy. Thereafter, the Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup 
truck with said funds from the joint American Funds account and 
this pickup truck was titled jointly with the Petitioner. The 
Respondent later sold the pickup truck and placed the proceeds of 
the sale into the American Funds account held in joint tenancy with 
the Petitioner. The Respondent also added a portion of his 
earnings during the marriage to this account during the marriage. 
The funds in this account have been commingled and have not 
remained the separate property of the Respondent. This American 
Funds account should be equally divided between the Respondent and 
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the Petitioner, 
14. In November 2003, the Respondent purchased a 2000 
GMC Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full. No 
loan obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle. The 
truck is titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner. 
The present NADA value of this marital asset exceeds $22,000.00. 
The Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy 
wheels and running boards to this vehicle the value of which is 
$1,000.00. The value of this marital asset should be divided 
equally between the Respondent and the Petitioner. 
15. The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after 
the parties' separation because an accident, not the fault of the 
Petitioner, totaled the 1997 Cadillac DeVille driven by the 
Petitioner at the time of separation. This motor vehicle is titled 
solely in the Petitioner's name. The Petitioner owes nearly 
$7,000.00, to Box Elder Credit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and 
her monthly payment thereon is $129.68, per month. The ownership 
and all right, title and interest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired 
after the parties' separation by the Petitioner, is awarded to her 
and she is ordered to pay the debt thereupon. 
16. The only debt of the parties is a GM credit card and 
the balance owed thereupon is $4,282.73. The credit card was used 
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during the marriage.for family expenses such as bill payments, 
Christmas and birthday gifts, airline tickets and motel 
reservations. The Respondent should be ordered to pay the debt to 
the GM credit card in the above stated sum. 
17. The Petitioner has incurred costs and attorney fees 
herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-seven 
Dollars Sixty-nine Cents ($15,257.69), through trial. The 
Petitioner borrowed Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($3,500.00), from her son to pay a retainer to her counsel at the 
commencement of this action. The Petitioner's counsel submitted an 
Attorney's Affidavit specifying the services performed and the 
charges therefore. The attorney fees the Petitioner agreed to pay 
is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case. The hourly rate is 
reasonable in light of the circumstances of this case and the fees 
of other experienced lawyers in the community and the services 
performed for the Petitioner by her counsel were reasonable and 
necessary. The Petitioner does not have the ability to compensate 
her counsel and the Respondent has the ability to pay the 
Petitioner's costs and attorney fees from his employment and other 
income and other assets. The Respondent should 'be ordered to 
forthwith pay the Petitioner's costs and attorney fees incurred 
herein in the sum, of $»jt-fJ.2 D 7 .-£ 0^ and the Petitioner is awarded 
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judgment against the Respondent therefore. 
THE COURT, having made and entered Findings of Fact now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW J}\A A. C <L6l/fc! 
The Court has both in personam and subject matter 
jurisdictior^of the parties in this action. if ft 
2. The Petitioner and the Respondent were married on the 
20th day of August, 1960, in City of Dalton within the State of 
Massachusetts, and \ave been married in the LDS Temple and have 
since remained husbancd and wife, a period of nearly forty-four 
(44), years. This is a Varriage of long-term. 
3. IrreconcilabJSe differences exist between the parties 
rendering this marriage no logger viable and making reconciliation 
impossible. The Petitioner should be awarded a divorce against the 
Respondent. 
4. Four (4), childrerV were born as issue of the 
Petitioner and the Respondent. All orvsaid children are adults and 
are fully emancipated and are not depe\dent upon the parties for 
their support. 
5. The Petitioner retired frorfk the Shepard Montana 
School District in 1994. She receives retirement income from the 
State of Montana in the sum of One Hundred Eighty Dollars Seventy-
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three Cents ($180.73), per month. The Petitioner also receives 
Social Security income in the sum of Six Hundred Thirty-five 
Dollars ($6^5.00), per month at the time of trial. The 
Petitioner's social security income has been reduced by Seventy-
three Dollars ($73\. 00) , since trial. The Petitioner is completely 
disabled and unableVo engage in gainful employment. 
6. The Respondent receives Social Security income in 
excess of One Thousand M O Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00), per 
month. The Respondent deposited into the parties joint bank 
account income from investments and social security from June, 
2003, through April, 2004, the\eleven (11), months prior to the 
parties' separation, in the sum\ of $42,265.35, which averages 
$3,842.30, per month. These deposits did not include his income 
from his employment at Century 21 ReaJS. Estate nor the Petitioner's 
social security and retirement income. \ 
7. The Respondent has had heart surgery and has had 
stints placed in his heart several years agto and has other medical 
problems but remains gainfully employed. \ The Respondent is 
presently employed as a real estate agent at \entury 21, in St. 
George, Utah. His adjusted gross income from his \099, at Century 
21 in the year 2004, was Forty-seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-
six Dollars Forty-three Cents ($47,276.43), although TWenty-seven 
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Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($27,600.00), of said sum was an 
unusual commission. The Respondent's average monthly income from 
Century 2 l \ alone for the year 2004, was Three Thousand Nine 
Hundred ThirtyVnine Dollars Seventy Cents ($3,939.70). 
The Respondent submitted his Exhibit 19, which purported 
to itemize his employment expenses. The Respondent testified that 
the expenses listed orK Exhibit 19, were for the years 2003, 2004 
and 2005, and that many oK the expenses listed were paid by Century 
21. Several other expenses\were one-time costs such as a laptop 
computer and automobile repairs to his vehicle which he uses both 
for employment and personal use.\ Many other expenses were listed 
more than once or were duplicated \such as tax payments and auto 
repairs.) The Respondent also listed\as an expense on Exhibit 19, 
the spousal support he has been payings the Petitioner since the 
entry of the Temporary Order in this action. The Respondent's 
adjusted gross monthly income is Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($4,500.00), per month. 
8. The Petitioner's monthly living \expenses are Three 
Thousand Three Hundred Four Dollars Eighty-nine c\nts ($3,304.89), 
per month. Her monthly need for financial or spousaSL support from 
the Respondent (following the deduction of her monthly social 
security and retirement income in the sum of $742. l\) is Two 
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Thousand \Four Hundred Eighty-nine Dollars Sixteen Cents 
($2/489.16)\ per month. 
Tha Respondent has the ability to pay said sum as spousal 
support from lAs Social Security and investment income and from his 
employment income at Century 21. The Petitioner is entitled to 
maintain the standard of living to which the parties have become 
accustomed and this J^ S a long-term marriage. The Petitioner should 
be awarded permanent spousal support which should be paid by the 
Respondent in the sum Twcx Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00), per month 
on the 1st day of each monrh hereafter and said sum should be paid 
by the Respondent to the Petitioner from and after March 1, 2005, 
the date of the trial of this faction. 
9. The Respondent deposited his income from Century 21, 
into the State Bank of Southern Utah during the parties marriage. 
On July 16, 2005, the Respondent testified that he had earned a 
commission of $27,600.00, on June 1, 2(A)4, which he had deposited 
into his personal account at the State Batak of Southern Utah and 
that all of the funds in this account were hisv- The Respondent had 
also deposited several thousand dollars in a separate account at 
Zions Bank. Paragraphs 5, and 7, of the Court's Oro^r Arising from 
Order to Show Cause Hearing refer to these accounts ancNcrdered the 
division of these accounts reserved for trial and any\ amounts 
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withdrawn therefrom offset against any other amount awarded at the 
time of trial. \ The Petitioner received a lump sum payment of Five 
Thousand Dollars\($5,000.00), following the hearing upon her order 
to show cause. in any event, the monies in the accounts were 
marital property having been earned by the Respondent during the 
marriage from commissions earned as a real estate agent at Century 
21, where he had been employed since 2002. The Petitioner and the 
Respondent should each be awarded one-half (^), of the value of the 
accounts at Southern Utah State Bank and Zions Bank and all other 
accounts existing at the time ok the hearing upon the Order to Show 
Cause. The Respondent should forthwith pay the Petitioner said 
sums and she should be awarded a j\idgment against the Respondent 
therefore. \ 
10. The Petitioner and the Respondent purchased a 
residence and real property in October\ 2002, and during the 
marriage situate at 1020 East Fort.Pierce Drive in the City of St. 
George in the County of Washington within theV^tate of Utah. The 
purchase price of the parties' home and real Yproperty was One 
Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Dollars ($149,000.00)\ U.S. Bank is 
owed Eighty-two Thousand Forty-two Dollars Seventy-one Cents 
($82,042.71), as of the date of trial and the paymentV thereon is 
Six Hundred Thirty-eight Dollars Ninety-one Cents ($638\91), per 
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month. 
The fair market value of the parties' residence and real 
property as of February 24, 2005, was One Hundred Eighty-five 
Thousand Dollars ($.185,00^.00). Accordingly, the parties have just 
less than One Hundred Th\ee Thousand Dollars ($103,000.00), of 
equity in the marital residence and real property. The Petitioner 
paid Eight Thousand DollarsX ($8,000.00), from her separate 
inherited funds toward the purchase of the marital residence and 
real property. \ 
The Petitioner should be Warded the ownership and all 
right, title and interest in and tea said residence and real 
property subject to the Respondent's lYen for his share of the 
equity therein in the sum of Forty-seveny Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($47,500.00). The Petitioner shalApay the payments and 
debt to U.S. Bank upon the residence and real property. The 
Respondent should forthwith quit claim the ownership and all right, 
title and interest therein to the Petitioner. \ The Petitioner 
should be entitled to reside in the marital residence and real 
property until she dies, or until the home and real Property are 
sold. The sale of the marital residence and real property shall be 
in the Petitioner's sole discretion. The Petitioner shaM not be 
required to pay the Respondent's lien until such time as she sells 
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the marital residence and real property. In the event that the 
Petitioner chooses iiot to sell the residence and real property and 
the Respondent dies Moefore his equity lien is paid to him, said 
equity lien shall became an asset of the Respondent's estate. 
11. The Respondent has in his possession marital 
property which he took wiVh him at the time of separation. These 
items include a refrigerators, television, chest of drawers, laptop 
computer, lounging chairs, a W e e n desk, the barometer, a crystal 
chandelier, golf clubs, fishing\gear, camping gear, 2 shop vacuums, 
saws, drills and several other \tools, all purchased during the 
marriage. He also has weapons which were purchased during the 
marriage including 3 rifles, a revoWr and reloading equipment. 
The Petitioner nor the Respondent made any claim for 
personal property in the possession of\the other at the time of 
trial. The Petitioner and the Respondent acquired household 
furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances and other personal 
property during their marriage which have beerrv divided between the 
parties and which should be awarded pursuant tc\ this division. 
12. Each party should be awarded his\ or her personal 
effects. \ 
13. The Respondent acquired pension, retirement and 
stock benefits during the parties' marriage which aVe presently 
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held by American Funds.- These funds have not yet been divided 
although the Petitioner's counsel has submitted a Domestic 
Relations Order for execution by the Court. The Respondent should 
forthwith execute all documents necessary to effectuate the 
division of all of the American Funds Accounts specifically, but 
not limited to an IRA Distribution Request form provided to the 
Respondent's counsel by the Petitioner's counsel on January 4, 
2005, which requires the Respondent's signature guarantee in 
Section 7. The guaranteed signature of the Respondent is required 
before American Funds can distributed the Respondent's pension and 
retirement IRAs. \ 
14. The Respondent depositee^ into a separate American 
Funds account approximately $32,045.00, whYch he inherited from his 
father in 1999. The Respondent and the Petitioner created this 
account with American Funds in joint tenancy- Thereafter, the 
Respondent purchased a new GMC pickup truck with said funds from 
the joint American Funds account and this pickupYtruck was titled 
jointly with the Petitioner. The Respondent later.\sold the pickup 
truck and placed the proceeds of the sale into the Werican Funds 
account held in joint tenancy with the Petitioner. TFVe Respondent 
then purchased the 2000 GMC pickup truck referred toV below and 
titled this vehicle in the parties' names jointly. The Respondent 
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also added a portion, of his earnings during the marriage to this 
account during the marriage. The funds in this account have been 
commingled and have not\ remained the separate property of the 
Respondent. The American mnds accounts are marital property and 
should be equally divided\ between the Respondent and the 
Petitioner. A qualified domestic relations order should issue to 
effectuate the division of all re\irement, pension, IRA, and other 
accounts. 
15. In November 2003, th& Respondent purchased a 2000 
GMC Extended Cab 4x4 pickup truck which he paid for in full. No 
loan obligation or other liens exist against this vehicle. The 
truck is titled in the names of the Respondent and the Petitioner. 
The present NADA value of this marital asset\exceeds $22,000. The 
Respondent has also added a satellite radio, tool box, fancy wheels 
and running boards to this vehicle the value of nhich is $1,000.00. 
The value of the equity in this marital asset should be divided 
between the Respondent and the Petitioner, 
16. The Petitioner purchased a 2002 Toyota Camry after 
the parties' separation because an accident, not the Vault of the 
Petitioner, totaled the 1997 Cadillac DeVille drivW by the 
Petitioner at the time of separation. This motor vehicle Vs titled 
solely in the Petitioner's name. The Petitioner owes\ nearly 
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$7,000.00, to Box Elder C^redit Union upon the 2002 Toyota Camry and 
her monthly payment therein is $129.68, per month. The ownership 
and all right, title and Viterest in 2002 Toyota Camry, acquired 
after the parties' separation* by the Petitioner is awarded to her 
and she is ordered to pay the tiebt thereupon. 
17. The only debt of Wie parties is a GM credit card and 
the balance owed thereupon is $4,^2.73. The credit card was used 
during the marriage for family expenses such as bill payments, 
Christmas and birthday gifts, aarline tickets and motel 
reservations. The Respondent should beVordered to pay the debt to 
the GM credit card in the above stated s\im. 
18. The Petitioner has incurredNcqsts and attorney fees 
herein in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Two\ Hundred Fifty-seven 
Dollars Sixty-nine Cents ($15,257.69), through trial. The 
Petitioner borrowed Three Thousand Five \ Hundred Dollars 
($3,500.00), from her son to pay a retainer to h4r counsel at the 
commencement of this action. The Petitioner's counsel submitted an 
Attorney's Affidavit specifying the services performed and the 
charges therefore. The attorney fees the Petitioner agreed to pay 
is $175.00 per hour plus the costs of the case. V 
The hourly rate is reasonable in light\ of the 
circumstances of this case and the fees of other experienced 
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lawyers in the community and the services performed for the 
Petitioner by her counsel were reasonable and necessary. The 
Petitioner does not have the ability to compensate her counsel and 
the Respondent has the ability to pay the Petitioner's costs and 
attorney fees from his employment and other income and assets. 
The Respondent should be ordered to pay the Petitioner's 
costs and attorney fees incurred\herein in the sum of $15,257.69, 
and the Petitioner should be awarded judgment against the 
Respondent therefore augmented by tfte costs and attorney fees 
incurred in the collection of the. judgments entered herein. 
DATED this day of Augikt, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE, 
Fifth Judicial District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /y day of August, 2005, 
I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to Gary G. Kuhlmann, Attorney for Respondent, at 
113 East 200 North, Suite 1, Posy^fficS^Ttes^lOSSV, St. George, 
Utah 84791. 
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